## Presidential-Congressional Relations in an Era of Polarized Parties and a 60-Vote Senate

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## Basics of Presidential-Congressional Relations

The president needs Congress to vote to support his positions

- It's a hard sell
- Some presidents are more successful than others
- **Party control of Congress is the most important determinant** of success
  - The president wins more roll calls if his party has a majority
  - The advantage of majority control is less in the Senate Or more accurately: the *disadvantage* of minority status is less in the Senate
- Party Polarization in Congress has altered this relationship
  - Different effects in the House & Senate
  - Majority presidents still win more often in both chambers, but polarization
  - Amplifies the benefit of majority control in the House:
    - □ Majority presidents win more; minority presidents win ( a lot) less
  - **Suppresses** success rates of both majority & minority presidents in the Senate

## The Puzzle

□ Why does polarization suppress presidential success in the Senate?


## □ The short answer:


(paraphrasing a motivational line from Clinton's campaign book)


"It's the minority *Party* filibuster stupid"

# Evidence of the Minority Party Filibuster

- Exponential increase in cloture votes over time (Fig. 1)
- Before Clinton cloture less common on presidential roll calls (Fig. 2)
- Institutionalization of 60-vote Senate by George W. Bush administration
- **Transformed filibuster & cloture into Minority** *Party* **tool (Fig. 3)**









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
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




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
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
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- □ Institutionalization of 60-vote Senate by George W. Bush administration
- □ Transformed filibuster & cloture into Minority *Party* tool
  - No formal change in cloture rule (or its interpretation until Nov. 2013 nuclear option)
  - But behavior changed—voting on presidential roll calls has become highly partisan
    - Partisanship increased on all types of presidential roll calls
    - Especially high on cloture votes (Fig. 3)





□ House: Augments advantage of majority control


As polarization increases,

majority presidents win more; minority presidents win less (Fig. 4a)













- □ Senate: **Suppresses** presidential success
  - As polarization increases,
    success rates of both majority & minority presidents decrease (Fig. 4b)
- $\Box$  If it's the filibuster & cloture, then
  - the pattern on non-cloture votes should look more like the House (Fig. 4c)
- And the pattern of presidential success on cloture votes,
  should be a mirror image of the House (Fig. 4d)












- Senate: Suppresses Success Rates
  - As polarization increases,
    - Success rates of both majority & minority presidents decrease (Fig. 4b)
- □ If the minority party filibuster is the cause, then the pattern on *non-cloture* votes should look more like the House (Fig. 4c)
- And the pattern of presidential success on cloture votes, should be a mirror image of the House (Fig. 4d)









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  - Why is a 60-vote Senate so hard on majority presidents?
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# Table 1Presidential Positions on Cloture Votes

	<b>Minority Presidents</b>	Majority Presidents
	Nay	Yea
Pre-Bush Years	67.8%	95.7%
	(40/59)	(44/46)
<b>Bush/Obama Years</b>	83.3%	97.6%
	(30/36)	(81/83)
All Years	73.7%	96.9%
	(70/95)	(125/129)

- Presidents win 93% if they opposed invoking cloture vs. 15% if they support it
  It's a lot easier to win if you only need 41 votes rather than 60
- □ Minority party presidents usually oppose invoking cloture (74% nay positions)
  - Increased from 68% in pre-Bush years to 83% for Bush & Obama
- □ Majority party presidents almost always support cloture (97% yea positions)
  - Not much room to increase in recent years (96% to 98%)
  - But Bush & Obama took positions on 83 cloture votes vs. 46 in pre-Bush years

# Conclusions

Party polarization: different effects on presidential success in the House & Senate
 House:

- As parties become more cohesive, party control becomes more important—majority party presidents win more; minority party presidents win less
- Why?
  - □ House is a majoritarian institution
  - □ Cohesive majorities help majority presidents & hinder minority presidents
- Senate:
  - As parties become more cohesive, both majority & minority presidents win less
  - Why?
    - □ Senate is a super-majoritarian institution
    - □ Cohesive parties hinder both majority & minority presidents
      - Majority presidents less likely to get opposition votes necessary to invoke cloture
      - Minority presidents less able to impede scheduling of objectionable floor votes



## Jon, Rich, and Jeff





Figure 3a Partisanship on Cloture and Other Presidential Votes



## The Measures

Dependent Variable: Presidential Success Score

- Annual percentage of presidential victories on conflictual roll calls,1953-2013
- Party Control
  - 1 if president's party controls the chamber; 0 otherwise
  - Why not use interval measure w/ more information (percent of president's party)?
    - □ More on this shortly
- **Party Polarization** 
  - Annual percentage of conflictual roll calls w/ majority of Dems. vs. majority of Reps.
  - Exclude consensus roll calls (less than 10% in the minority)
  - Interpretation: percentage of *all conflict* on roll call votes that is *party* conflict
- Presidential popularity
  - Average annual percentage approving of the president's job performance (Gallup)

Wouldn't it be better to use percent of the president's party?

Dichotomous party control variable throws out information

- Standard practice is to use percent of the president's party
- Does the interval measure add *useful* information over the simple majority/minority dichotomy?
  - Not much
  - Primary benefit of party control = president's co-partisans control key levers of power (committees; agenda control)

Let's look at some evidence (Table 1)


## Table 1 The Effects of Party Control & the President's Party Margin on Presidential Success in the House & Senate, 1953-2010

Variables	House	Senate
Party Control (majority party president = 1)		11.97
	(5.57)	(2.10)
President's Party Margin (President's party % - Opposition party %)		0.37
	(-0.71)	(2.18)
Constant	41.24	55.87
	(11.36)	(18.77)
Ν	58	58
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.61	0.47
t-values in parentheses		


Significant coefficient for president's party margin in the Senate
 Implies that percent of president's party has independent effects in the Senate

- Magnitude of effect seems similar to party control dummy
- Plot of the relationships suggests a different interpretation


## Figure 1 The Relationship between Party Control & Presidential Success in the House




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
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## Figure 2 The Relationship between Party Control & Presidential Success in the Senate



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