A nuclear weapon? In space?

At the end of February, the United States government made headlines when it sounded the alarm that Russia could be planning to launch a nuclear weapon into orbit at some point this year. While there are few details available about the specifics of this weapon, the potential threat was enough to provoke concerns about US national security, particularly as it relates to the nation’s satellite network in space.

To better understand the national security implications of Russia’s nuclear space weapon, we asked SIS professors Joshua Rovner and William Akoto to explain how the US would address threats to its satellites and analyze whether space could become the battlefield of the future.  

In February, the United States warned its allies that Russia could launch a nuclear weapon into orbit this year. Though details on the specifics of the weapon are slim, the US is raising alarm over this perceived threat. What are the national security concerns for the US and its allies if Russia can successfully deploy this technology?

Akoto: The development of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon with a nuclear component by Russia, as indicated by media reports, raises several national security concerns for the United States and its allies. For one, the US and many of our allies heavily rely on satellites for critical functions including military and civilian communications, navigation (particularly the GPS system), and weather monitoring. The US also relies on satellites for intelligence gathering and as part of the early warning systems for missile launches. The Russian ASAT weapon could potentially disable or destroy these space-based assets, effectively shutting down the military and civilian systems that depend on these assets.

From a policy perspective, the deployment and potential use of nuclear-armed ASAT weapons introduce a direct nuclear threat in space, raising the stakes of any conflict. This could also lead to situations where intentions are misinterpreted, and defensive actions are miscalculated. This is particularly worrying given the current tensions between the US and Russia.

Rovner: We don't know what this technology is, so we can only speculate. Some believe it is a space-launched nuclear weapon that would target US and partner satellites. The concern here is that Russia could trade large nuclear explosions in place of precise anti-satellite attacks. Accuracy is less important when nuclear weapons are in play. 

Others suggest that Russia seeks a nuclear-powered electronic warfare platform for jamming space-based communications. Because the US depends on space to fight well on Earth, such a capability might help Russia obstruct US military operations without taking the risk of detonating a nuclear device. 

How does the United States combat threats to national security as it pertains to its network of satellites in space?

Rovner: It is possible to protect satellites from electronic warfare and offensive cyberspace operations. It is more difficult to protect large satellites in fixed orbits from kinetic attacks (e.g., anti-satellite missiles). One possible solution is to diversify the satellite constellation and invest more in cheaper and smaller platforms. More satellites reduce the consequences of a strike on any one of them. US officials, however, may be concerned that Russia seeks to use nuclear weapons as a way of targeting multiple satellites in a single attack. 

Akoto: The United States currently employs a variety of strategies to protect and combat threats to its satellite network. While specifics are often classified, this includes both active ground-based anti-satellite weapons that can reach targets in low-earth orbit and passive defense measures such as making satellites smaller, more maneuverable, and harder to detect or target. It also involves collaboration with allies and commercial partners to enhance collective security, alongside the establishment of the US Space Force to oversee military space operations.

According to a 2022 Defense Intelligence Agency report, both Russia and China increased their space fleets by 70 percent between 2019 and 2021 and enlarged their satellite presence by more than 200 percent between 2015 and 2018. What are the implications of increased competition among the US, Russia, and China in space? Will space become the battlefield of the future?

Akoto: The escalating space competition among the US, Russia, and China is worrying because of the difficulties it imposes in terms of space traffic management, space debris, and the potential militarization of space. However, whether space becomes a battlefield of the future or not largely depends on how these states act to regulate competition and manage tensions between them. While current trends suggest we are likely to see increased competition and militarization of space in the coming years, there is also a growing recognition of the need for cooperation in space, given the heavy reliance of these countries on space-based assets for economic, civilian, and scientific purposes. The emerging challenge for these countries is how to balance national security interests with the imperative to preserve space as a sustainable and peaceful domain.

Rovner: Space is already important for modern conventional war, given the importance of space-based intelligence and communications. Satellites make it much easier to coordinate the movements of military forces across vast distances. Because the costs of launching and operating space assets are declining, we shouldn't be surprised to see other states investing in new systems.

That said, this isn't the first time we have seen great powers grapple with the prospects of warfighting in a new domain. As I explained in a recent book, strategists asked very similar questions about naval warfare in the seventeenth century, when new technologies were making it possible to build large warships for blue water operations. Some thought that mastery of the seas was the key to victory in future wars. Strategists said much the same after the invention of powered flight in the early twentieth century. Some thought that the ability to fly over the front lines would make armies obsolete, and the ability to deliver bombs from a safe height would make navies extremely vulnerable. 

Things didn't quite work out that way. Navies and air forces have proven important, of course, but not on their own. Sea control and air supremacy are useful, but they are not enough—war is a complicated business. Moreover, the early naval and air theorists did not always foresee the technical difficulties that came with operating in new domains, nor did they anticipate the ways in which adversaries on land might adapt. 

Something similar may be playing out in space today. The ability to operate in a new domain has led to hopes that controlling space will provide a decisive advantage in future wars as well as fears that adversaries will leap ahead. I suspect that a period of technical competition will let some of the air out from these hopes and fears. States will continue to invest in space, but over time, they will temper their expectations about what they can accomplish there.