On April 17, the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace convened a webinar entitled "Between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran: Kurdistan's Precarious Position" to examine the impact of US, Israeli, and Iranian conflicts on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The event was moderated by Yerevan Saeed, Barzani Scholar in Residence at American University's School of International Service. The featured speakers were Dr. Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, founding president of the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil, and Dr. Ken Pollack, Vice President for Policy at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C.

Both speakers characterized the Kurdistan Region as vulnerable because of its strategic partnerships and frequent neglect by policymakers in Washington. The absence of diplomatic support from key American officials in recent years has left Kurdistan isolated, diminished its autonomy, and strengthened Baghdad's position. Delays in the provision of defensive weaponry and intelligence support, particularly following repeated missile attacks, have further illustrated this neglect. Additionally, American policymakers have often disregarded Kurdish appeals for increased assistance during budgetary crises resulting from tensions between Erbil and Baghdad.

Dr. Ala'Aldeen established the context early in the discussion, stating, "Kurdistan has been a small fish in a big tank with big whales fighting." Despite attempts to maintain neutrality, the Kurdistan Region has experienced over 650 missile and drone attacks since the onset of the conflict, targeting civilian areas, oil facilities, and economic infrastructure. He described the 40-day war as "a very difficult time for the people of Kurdistan," noting that rockets were launched both by Iran-backed militias in Iraq and directly from Iran.

An additional political dimension worsened the situation. Iran accused the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of sheltering and arming Kurdish opposition groups operating from Iraqi Kurdistan, which, according to Ala'Aldeen, "attracted a lot more attacks than otherwise would have been." As a result, Kurdistan faced repercussions for such perceived activities by Kurdish groups opposed to Tehran.

A more profound issue identified was the disparity between Kurdistan's partnership with the United States and the limited protection it has received. While Erbil received some air defense coverage for American bases, the majority of the region remained vulnerable. "Such a strategic partnership, over years if not decades, could have been better cemented into mutual protection," remarked Ala'Aldeen who characterized the shortfall as "a bit of a disappointment." He also acknowledged internal challenges, noting that divisions and a fragmented security structure have increased the region's vulnerability. These divisions originate from rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), resulting in separate party-aligned security forces. The absence of unified command and coordination undercuts the effectiveness of collective defense efforts.

Pollack reinforced this critical perspective, stating, "Washington should pay attention to everything Dlawer just said." He attributed the neglect to a shift in U.S. policy approximately fifteen years ago, when successive administrations, beginning with Obama and continuing through Trump and Biden, regarded Iraq primarily as "an adjunct to our Iran policy." This indifference extended to Kurdistan, leaving the region dangerously exposed during periods of conflict. As Pollack observed, "Kurdistan became collateral damage of this poorly planned, at least politically, war effort by the United States."

To address the gap, both speakers suggested that a more effective U.S. approach would include explicit commitments to Kurdistan's security, enhanced diplomatic cooperation in both Baghdad and Erbil, and targeted economic assistance to promote regional stability. Establishing a formal defense partnership, supporting efforts to unify Kurdish political factions, and upholding consistent intelligence and air defense support would help transition from sporadic aid to a stronger and dependable relationship.

Ala'Aldeen pointed out the absence of a dedicated U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, noting that the ambassador to Turkey currently oversees Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria as well. He asserted, "Iraq and Kurdistan are too important to be without an ambassador." Ala'Aldeen further argued that Kurdistan should intensify its lobbying efforts in Washington to achieve greater policy clarity.

Regarding the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Ala'Aldeen defined them as a network of predominantly Iran-aligned militias integrated into all three branches of the Iraqi state. He referred to this arrangement as "hybrid sovereignty," wherein the militias retain independent agency and economic interests, but during conflict, "all the gloves are off" and they side with Iran's resistance axis, demonstrating ultimate loyalty to the Supreme Leader. According to Ala'Aldeen, Baghdad has not only failed to restrain the PMF but has as well refrained from condemning their attacks on Kurdistan. He noted, "The closest they got to condemning attacks on Kurdistan was a statement by the Coordination Framework, where they implicitly blamed America for mixing the cards."

Pollack expressed a similarly pessimistic outlook, describing the American expectation that the "good parts" of the Iraqi government would counteract the adverse elements as "a fool's errand." He argued that considerable progress would necessitate direct U.S. engagement in Iraqi politics, supporting actors capable of advancing the country's interests. Earlier cases such as the 2007 surge and the 2014-15 campaign against ISIS demonstrated that U.S. intervention can rapidly influence Iraq's internal dynamics. Pollack asserted that the resources required for such engagement would be "rather minor" compared as the broader campaign against Iran. He concluded that the principal obstacle is not financial, but rather a lack of political will, which he attributed to "the psychological hangover of the Iraq War."

Ala'Aldeen expressed doubt about future developments, doubting that Kurdistan would be addressed in any prospective U.S.-Iran agreement: "The word Kurdistan will not be uttered in that room." He further cautioned that, following the resolution of the larger Iran conflict, Iraq could become the next focal point of crisis: "There will be escalation in the near future, separate from the other war, a major, major escalation." He noted that PMF provocations have remained even during the ceasefire.

Several scenarios may unfold for the Kurdistan Region if current dynamics persist. Continued instability and insufficient external protection could render Kurdistan increasingly susceptible to attacks by Iran-aligned militias and other external actors, exacerbating humanitarian and economic crises. Alternatively, with international attention diverted elsewhere, Baghdad-backed or PMF-affiliated forces might increase their influence, further lessening Kurdish autonomy and undermining domestic cohesion. Additionally, in the absence of a more coherent U.S. strategy, local political divisions could intensify, weakening the KRG's capacity to address security challenges and negotiate from a position of strength. Without substantial changes in external policy or internal unity, Kurdistan may experience ongoing political marginalization and enduring security threats.

Pollack recounted that, at the end of Trump’s first term, Gulf leaders conveyed to him, "We can no longer count on the United States. You are unpredictable and unreliable. We simply have to make policy based on what is best for ourselves." For Kurdistan, which has traditionally depended on its relationship with the United States, this represents a serious challenge. Both speakers encouraged Kurdish leaders to internalize this message and modify their strategies correspondingly.

Although Kurdistan’s longstanding partnership with the United States has not recently produced concrete security guarantees, Washington remains essential for the KRG. However, without a clear policy, goodwill alone does not ensure protection, and the United States does not currently provide a strategic security umbrella for the Kurdistan Region. Kurdish leaders should continue systematic lobbying and diplomatic engagement with Washington, while also pursuing additional diplomatic strategies to safeguard regional interests. Strengthening ties with European countries, increasing engagement with regional actors such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states, and expanding outreach to the United Nations and other multilateral organizations can help reduce reliance on Washington. Enhanced cooperation with Baghdad and neighboring states may also broaden Kurdistan’s support network and create new opportunities for economic and security collaboration. Proactive regional diplomacy will help Kurdistan navigate ongoing political uncertainties.

Watch the recording here.