International

Toward a United Europe

Faced with increasing security threats, the European Union needs to aggressively pursue a policy of rearmament defense cooperation, all while preparing their populations for the hard road ahead.

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Introduction

In 1919 journalist Milena Jesenská wrote of a Vienna that “sung and played more waltzes and frivolous operettas than ever before,” while simultaneously describing how the same Vienna “was dying away, full of reparation committees, while its political leaders traveled the world over requesting aid.” Today, this macabre scene is once again playing out across a Europe reeling from the social, economic, and political consequences of the war in Ukraine. However, as dire as this situation may be, it provides a unique opportunity for European policymakers to reshape the continent’s place in the global order. To do this there must be an acceleration in cooperative defense industrial development, a move towards an integrated European command structure, and a concerted effort to prepare a lethargic Europe for conflict. With these changes, Europe will emerge stronger, more unified, and capable of meeting the renewed threat from Russia.

The Tools of the Trade

The apocalyptic state that Europe found itself in after the Second World War led to the emergence of a peculiar defense procurement ecosystem reliant on firms based in the United States. While this was necessary at the time to rapidly build defense capabilities, it effectively turned Europe into a branch plant economy whose defense technology came almost exclusively from across the Atlantic. Later in the century, heavy industry on the continent began to recover, but inefficiently produced duplicate products for the still US-dominated EU market. The already bad situation for this sluggish sector was made worse by stagnant or even declining defense budgets after the fall of the Soviet Union. This weakness continued unnoticed by the politicians until the invasion of Ukraine when the whole structure came crashing down. 

With an industrial base fragmented along national lines and chronically underfunded, hope of meeting military aid goals dwindled. Reality set in in late 2023 when European leaders announced that they would fail to deliver the promised one million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. This international embarrassment was met with a call from president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyento “turbocharge” domestic defense industry and prompted  the publication of the first ever European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), which advocates for the creation of a collaborative industrial environment across the Eurozone. But collaboration isn’t enough. 

Nothing short of rapid consolidation and the normalization of joint procurements (member states buying weapons together and buying them in Europe) can save the European Defense and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) from itself. A report from McKinsey & Company found that the EU could save over 30% a year on weapons procurement if it adopted these practices. Facing an adversary with a horizontally integrated defense industry, these drastic steps must be taken to meet production demands the current disorganized market simply fails to. Europe can no longer afford the delays caused by an overreliance on the United States and a fragmented industrial base. This consolidated EDTIB will allow supply to respond swiftly to the dynamic demands of member states. 

Strategic Harmony

Today, there exists no coordinated European command structure within the framework of the EU. All international military coordination between the states takes place under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Allied Command Operations (ACO) center. While to some this may not seem like a problem, this means limited channels to plan European missions, overreliance on United States assets, and a reduction in readiness. To highlight these operational gaps, one need only look at France’s 2013 peacekeeping operation in Mali,  which  required the use of emergency assistance from the United States in the form of air-refueling and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 drawdown clause. This clause was designed to address crises, not to support the operations of wealthy nations.

The importance of having an efficient European coordinating body can be found in a 2020 study of inter-European response to the outbreak of wildfires in in Bouches-du-Rhône. Here the fire authority trialed a coordinated EU command structure and found a marked increase in their ability to respond to incidents faster and more efficiently. In a volatile era where minutes matters, the moment to solve the EU’s strategic cacophony through a unified command structure has come.

Together for Peace

Being nearly a hundred years removed from the last world war, many EU citizens are reluctant to support a remilitarization of this scale. This feeling is particularly acute amongst younger generations where as little as 36% of people would fight for their country. All the above measures would be ineffective without the manpower to operate weapons or the talent to organize a European defense. The gravity of the current crisis required the EU to prepare for the worst by implementing national service. 

After the Cold War ended, conscription seemed to be on its way out. But in order to maintain a defensive posture this should be reexamined, a process Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania are already undergoing. Conscription is a way to not only increase capabilities but also build a sense of shared European identity. 

Conclusion

As the discotheques stay packed while the bombs fall merely a border away, policymakers have the choice to address these problems. If industrial policy, defense planning, and manpower can be coordinated, the EU will emerge stronger for it. Milena Jesenská’s politicians of the interwar years failed to meet aggression with strength––will today’s fail as well?

About the Author

Owen Oppenheimer is a student at American University’s School of International Service where he focuses on Foreign Policy & Global Security. He is concurrently an intern for the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) and a member of the Texas State Society. He has previously written for the Pericles Institute as a Defense Fellow.