Introduction

The transatlantic international order often exerts influence in state-building by prioritizing elections to occur as soon as possible. This methodology is flawed; not only are immediate elections often unhealthy for democracy but the involvement of the transatlantic community, when overbearing and done without consideration for how the public perceives their involvement, is detrimental to a successful state-building mission. Academia shows us that nations need time to process collective trauma, collect themselves, and use the state to move through a patient post-conflict process. That thinking was not deployed in Iraq or Liberia, just two examples from the last 20 years. This is especially evident in Haiti, a nation whose path to statehood has cast serious doubt on the state's governing mandate and left the people skeptical of foreign involvement. Haiti gained its independence by paying a sum totaling 560 million dollars in today's money to France; the nation has also endured U.S. occupation reinforcing the stigma of foreign intervention. Iraq and Liberia faced similarly troubling paths to statehood. Both suffered under European-American colonialism, both also saw the transatlantic community finding significant interest in the Sisyphean task of repairing their societies and the construction of their democracies by conducting elections, in both cases, less than a year removed from internal armed conflict. However, both Liberia and Iraq struggled greatly from a divided society with a weak state at the center allowing for political violence, corruption, and an ever-present lack of trust with the government. 

In response to the near-total collapse of Haiti's state structures following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the Caribbean Council, in collaboration with the United States, has appointed a nine-person tribunal to help govern the nation. The primary goal of this tribunal is to serve as a 'critical step toward free and fair elections.' This comes as armed groups of citizens, with a diverse set of interests, have stripped the central government of almost all authority in swaths of the country. While this approach aligns with the U.S. and its transatlantic partners' standard strategy in similar circumstances, it reflects a grave misunderstanding of effective state-building in post-conflict environments. Following Haitian requests for intervention, this approach fails to account for the effects of intervention on state-building and legitimacy in a post-conflict environment. Both situations put the US and its partners in a difficult, reflective posture. What happens when elections are proven to hinder rather than help democracy building? What if a nation requests intervention through the institutions of liberal internationalism and that delegitimizes said government? These dilemmas challenge core pillars of U.S-European foreign policy and are untenable unless foundational targets are met.

Theoretical Understandings of Post-Conflict Elections and Peace

Various scholars have argued against immediate elections as a means to establish a legitimate democracy. This comes as elections are a delicate process and societal mistrust can deeply harm their legitimacy. Elections in new, post-conflict democracies, can be destabilizing. Dr. Irfan Nooruddin, of Georgetown University, and Dr. Thomas Floresa, George Mason University, theorized as much in their paper in the Journal of Politics, “The Effect of Elections on Post-conflict Peace and Reconstruction,” published in 2012. The two posit that the quicker the election is held, the less likely it is to benefit the democracy's long-term survival, as mistrust throughout the society remains rampant in many cases. Floresa and Nooruddin recommend at least one year of state and institution building before an election can be safely held. This gives the state time to build the capacity to manage a free and fair election while allowing candidates and political machines to build public trust and allocate resources toward running successful campaigns. Some routine failures of democracies that hasten their elections include corruption within the electoral process, a lack of voter inclusion, and a persistent mistrust in opposing groups and new institutions. These problems subside over time if institutions are well-equipped in post-conflict zones. Reconciliation is crucial here. How can one be expected to stand in a poll line behind someone who potentially played a part in harming them or their community? Reconciling these differences, punishing particularly violent actors, and offering support to marginalized communities is more immediately crucial to any developing nation than holding any sort of election without consideration of the above items. It is just as crucial that these are the efforts the transatlantic community supports and prioritizes.  

Intervention and How it Damages the Peace and Election Process

To first build a post-conflict democracy, a nation must construct a robust constitution. This constitution must have several key characteristics. These include but are not limited to, an equitable implementation of a constitution, one that permits inter-societal representation, a focus on a long-term vision for state success, new or revitalized institutions established within a post-conflict context, and limited international intervention. The implementation of a constitution post-peace settlement is a time-consuming process, as is the process in which a constitution is constructed. These time-consuming but ever-necessary traits within a constitution are critical to stability and a healthy democracy. 

Post-conflict theory is rooted in reconciliation and time. No one in Haiti is going to forget what they’ve been put through by their countrymen. It will take time to right these wrongs, and that is for the wrongs that can be righted. The warlords will have to be handled by a strong, loyal military, and tried by a tough and fair judiciary. No citizens can be seriously expected to invest in a government that has not done the bare minimum of righting the past's wrongs. Once the people see this happen, trust in the strength of the state will build. The state’s monopoly on force is trampled with overly ambitious foreign intervention and peacekeeping. If foreigners are the ones guarding your breadlines and polling stations then they are the legitimate wielders of force, not the government. Elections held under this cloud of foreign interference are elections without the mandate of force. The subsequent government will always be seen by some as one chosen by foreigners. 

Moving Forward

The U.S. and its partners can and should do what they can to improve the situation in Haiti. For the sake of the Haitian people and regional stability, this is essential. However, this must be done from a solid foundation of understanding how states earn the mandate to govern. Peace and the re-establishment of the rule of law is the priority. It does not come as quickly as an election by Christmas but creating a solid foundation in which the state, and its democratic mechanisms, can be built is the only first step towards a peaceful and enduring Haitian state, built by Haitians.